

Marcus Miessen

## Statu(t)e of liberty. Spatial location as a blueprint of evil.

[http://static.londonconsortium.com/issue01/miessen\\_statu\(t\)e.html](http://static.londonconsortium.com/issue01/miessen_statu(t)e.html)

---

© Marcus Miessen / Static / London Consortium 2005

---

STATIC is the web resource of the London Consortium, a unique collaboration between the Architectural Association, Birkbeck College (University of London), the Institute of Contemporary Arts, and Tate.

Aiming to initiate interdisciplinary intellectual debate about paradoxes of contemporary culture, Static presents contributions from an international team of academics, artists and cultural practitioners.

The materials, assembled for each issue around a theme, include analytical essays and articles, interviews, art projects, photographic images, etc. Static will welcome feedback, argument and commentary from scholars, artists and other readers, and will be regularly updated in order to communicate the most recent and relevant ideas and interpretations on the chosen topic.

<http://static.londonconsortium.com>

---



“The United States became engaged in two distinct conflicts, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq. As a result of a Presidential determination, the Geneva Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda and Taliban combatants.”<sup>3</sup>

#### Schlesinger Report

“The application of international law as the most severe method of architectural critique has never been more urgent. Crimes relating to the organisation of the built environment, originating on computer screens and drafting tables, call for placing an architect/planner, for the first time, on the accused stand of an international tribunal.”<sup>4</sup>

#### Eyal Weizman

## THE PRESENT RE-READ

This piece of writing attempts to understand the relationship between space and “evil acts”. It raises the question of how far spatial conditions have influenced and continue to affect conscious violations of Human Rights. A few years into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, decreasing public belief in political decision-making has made way for an overbearing universal ethics of mediated truisms. Post 9/11 in particular, one can trace an increasing habit of politicians to convert the mise-en-scene and tools of spatial planning in order to create microclimates, which do not obey any legal framework. There is evidence that spatial planning has been used as a mechanism to convert space into a strategic weapon of physical punishment. Simultaneously, one is witnessing the re-appropriation of issues such as representation, psychological framework and an increasingly monotheistic politics.

In 2004, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben re-interpreted the United States’ “war against all evil” as a symbolic gesture that envisions an alteration of the political landscape. Two months after the September attacks in 2001, the Bush administration—in the midst of what it perceived as a state of emergency—authorised the indefinite imprisonment of non-citizens suspected of terrorist activities. This policy, according to Agamben, should be understood as “The State of Exception”<sup>5</sup>, a powerful strategy that enables the transformation of a contemporary democracy into a civil dictatorship. Agamben argues that the “state of exception”, which was meant to be a provisional measure, has become part of the everyday fabric.

When the American president George W. Bush sent a TV-message to Vladimir Putin<sup>6</sup>, claiming that even in times of war one has to obey the guiding principles of democracy, Bush appeared concerned about the fact that Putin, after the massacre of Beslan<sup>7</sup>, had announced a strategy to strengthen and fortify the “verticality of power”<sup>8</sup>. In spite of that, ever since, the American president has sought to clarify that in “times of war”—in his terms a historical condition that shows no sign of abating—the “old” rules and international rights are no longer applicable and can therefore be “temporarily” suspended. This development essentially prepares the ground for a “war” that does not require justification and a policy undertaken on terrorism not rationally related to its prevention. Instead, it strengthens a policy that was already under way before the Twin Towers fell: “the war on terrorism needs to be read always as in quotes, because it is not in any conventional sense a war—no national enemy, no troops, no territorial goals as such.”<sup>9</sup> Rather than fighting the symptoms, the U.S. administration had blocked multi-lateral politics for too long. This policy finally had a boomerang effect and—propelled by irrational motives due to being caught by “surprise” — conclusions were drawn rapidly. But as early as 1992, the CIA had received numerous cables from Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Islamabad station’s liaison had informed the agency that Afghanistan was already being turned into a centre for terrorism.<sup>10</sup>

Now, given this reinterpretation of geopolitical legalities, “rights” are being exposed to the higher principle of potential war and the response towards

international terror. In this sense, military order, which reigns supreme, can temporarily defer international law. Accordingly, military judges replace civil courts and, in the name of National Security, the president—as the civil leader of the military—embodies unrestricted powers. Today, the underlying principle of justification for war is whether or not a particular action is taking place in the name of national interest while this very interest is being defined by the power that pursues it. In this context, the term “terror” is being polluted with “war”. Consequently, “war” allows for all civil rights to be suspended.

Such consideration reminds us of the countless individuals imprisoned in Camp X-Ray & Delta (Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), the detention centre at Bagram airport (Afghanistan), Abu Ghuraib prison (Iraq) and numerous third-country penitentiaries. They all have been exiled into territories that lack human rights monitoring, a situation that is legitimated by a White House directive which states that “terrorist” suspects do not deserve the rights given to prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions.

But in the General Provisions of the Geneva Conventions relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War<sup>11</sup>, a different code is outlined, which claims that one has to “ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances”<sup>12</sup> and formulates a clear definition about prisoners of war. According to the Conventions, prisoners of war “are persons, who have fallen into the power of the enemy: members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied.”<sup>13</sup> In order to prevent submission to the Geneva Conventions, the captured individuals and groups could therefore be moved into territories that disobey the Conventions, or territories that do not fall under its jurisdiction. The U.S. government therefore started to set up spatial constructs, which—in their belief—are not accountable to any higher authority.

This method of creating extra-legal territory also includes a technique known as “extraordinary renditions”.<sup>14</sup> In April 2005, Human Rights Watch released a summary of evidence of U.S. abuse of detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan, Cuba and other programmes of secret CIA detention.<sup>15</sup> The U.S. government openly admits that they seek diplomatic assurances from states where torture is a common phenomenon. This has deeply disturbing implications. Pro-actively proposing the creation of such territorial and legal islands of protection illustrates the importance of the function of space within the equation, and comes close to accepting the ocean of abuse that surrounds it.<sup>16</sup> In cases where foreign authorities or the United Nations have condemned such practices of torture, the U.S. has been seen to spatially transfer prisoners while simultaneously releasing a flood of “new” legal documents, which allow for particular codes of conduct within the military and the CIA. This technique, however, is neither new nor is it only practiced by the United States. The government of the United Kingdom is reportedly in negotiations with the Algerian and Moroccan governments, countries in which abusive treatment and torture is common, to allow the transfer of terrorism suspects.<sup>17</sup> In the eyes of the architects of such legal documents, a war against Iraq—for example—is legal, because it presents a case in self-defence and, further, an action in the interest of humanity.

## CRIME AND ITS BECOMING

“How can our government speak with authority about the evil of torture in countries like Egypt and Syria and Uzbekistan when it is knowingly making deals with the worst elements of those regimes to send people to the very dungeons where they torture prisoners?”<sup>18</sup>

Tom Malinowski, Washington Advocacy Director for  
Human Rights Watch

When Giorgio Agamben, both pre- and post-9/11<sup>19</sup>, discussed the principles of western society, he entertained a troubling hypothesis that is supported by legal documents that date from as far back as the Roman Empire. Influenced by Hannah Arendt’s work on totalitarianism and the institutional form of rights<sup>20</sup>, Agamben attempts to trace a historic process, one that is not a singular phenomenon, but a progression towards his primary thesis: there is an unforeseen similarity between democracy and totalitarianism. According to the Roman legal system, the one who threatened the republic was treated as a public enemy: as “Homo Sacer”—the one without rights—one was reduced to nothing but a living being and could be executed.<sup>21</sup>

More recently, the Patriot Act—enacted in October 2001—allows the United States government to take any individual who is suspected to threaten National Security into custody. But George W. Bush’s new military order turns those who are incarcerated in Guantanamo’s Camp X-Ray & Delta into lawless individuals, exteriorised from any juridical support-structure because of their territorial, that is *spatial*, status. Like so many other political prisoners in the course of history, these individuals have lost their juridical identity by having been put through a selection of political and spatial mechanisms. Although Agamben’s critique is radical in the sense that it is introducing an oversimplified and accelerated concept of comparison, what he is essentially doing is laying bare the danger of nationalistic structures. The videos and photographic footage coming out of Iraq’s Abu Ghuraib prison illustrate the drastic relevance of Agamben’s theory of the Homo Sacer. The naked bodies piled on top of each other and its sadistic choreography blend into a scene that recalls the fatal imagery of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Throughout history, cultures have projected what they considered as “evil” beyond their own territorial borders. Historic evidence illustrates that as soon as one realises that the reasons for so-called “evil acts” can be located inside one’s own territory, one refers to an existing “cruel” imagery of “the outside” in order to claim justification for actions aimed at protecting “the inside”.

In the case of Abu Ghuraib, we can trace the imagery of the colonial victor, but the space itself becomes exchangeable. And so does its historic reference. One reason for the public reception being so overwhelming could be described simply by referring to existing imagery. Rather than evoking a shock due to their specific message, the images coming out of Abu Ghuraib overlap with an existing 20<sup>th</sup> century imagery, a blend of the death camps of Auschwitz,

the pictures of deformed bodies in Vietnam, the death squad killings in El Salvador, the killing of the Tutsi in Rwanda, the genocides in Turkey, Sudan and Cambodia and the war crimes of collective punishment in Fallujah. From the Turks' massacre of Armenians in 1915 through the Serbians' slaughter of Bosnian and Albanian Muslims during the 1990s. The 20<sup>th</sup> century was an era of mass torture. In this context it is easy to fall into the encyclopaedic registers of evil in order to locate the image in one's own mind. Whether one thinks of the techniques used by colonial imperialists, Stalin's secret police [NKVD] or the Gestapo, one cannot really control any longer. Whether one recalls the imagery of *Salò*<sup>22</sup>, fascism or colonialism, these excesses of "evil acts" would always have two things in common: they would be tied to a particular, delineated territory, territorial enclaves, that act as a "house of evil", and an imagery of the subordinate subject. In this pornography of violence, the stage would change, but the choreography stays the same. Trying to bridge the gap between associated territories and the mainland, the U.S. is trying by all means to refer back to the outside, avoiding legal focus on their exterritorial enclaves while simultaneously talking about a "clean war".<sup>23</sup>

#### SPATIAL ENCLAVES AND THE RETURN OF RADICAL PUNISHMENT

"Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees; pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair; threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light (...)." <sup>24</sup>

Major General Antonio M. Taguba

Within this imagery, there seems to be a strong link to what Michel Foucault described as the "ceremonial of punishment"<sup>25</sup>: "some prisoners may be condemned to be hanged, (...) others, for more serious crimes, to be broken alive and to die on the wheel, after having their limbs broken; others to be broken until they die a natural death, others to be strangled and then broken, others to be burnt alive, (...) and others to have their heads broken."<sup>26</sup> In *Discipline & Punish, The Birth of the Prison*, Foucault illustrates how much physical punishment has become a hidden part of the penal process and "as a result, justice no longer takes public responsibility for the violence that is bound up with its practice."<sup>27</sup> As opposed to historic reference, in the 20<sup>th</sup> century—he argues—the spectacle of punishment has shifted to the trial. But if there is no trial, there is no scene. The disappearance of public punishment goes hand in hand with the decline of spectacle. Commenting on space and power, Paul Hirst subsequently defined such politics as "a much contested concept: it has many different meanings and possible spatial locations."<sup>28</sup> Foucault's treatment of the relation between a new form of power and a new class of

specialist structures regarded this both as the consequence and the condition of the rise of forms of “disciplinary power” from the 18<sup>th</sup> century onwards: “power is thus conceived of as fundamentally negative, as a punitive relation between the dominant and the subordinate subject.”<sup>29</sup> This form of power based on surveillance, which individuates and transforms, is defined by the penitentiary prison with its cells spatially isolating its inmates, with a central structure of inspection. What Hirst describes as the essential characteristics of Bentham’s Panopticon—“an ‘idea in architecture’”<sup>30</sup>—that is to say the principle that the many can be governed by the few, can be traced through the history of penitentiary construction. This is probably best exemplified by Abu Ghuraib’s “Liberty Tower”, a central inspection structure overlooking the territory: a space that enables both a certain correlative perspective and power relations. Although Foucault’s writings on the Panopticon originate from the 1970’s, his work seems more relevant than ever. He dissects the relationship between space and power. Moreover, what one witnesses at present could be described as an inversion of what Foucault depicted as the 19<sup>th</sup> century reduction in penal severity—“less cruelty, less pain, more kindness, more respect, more humanity.”<sup>31</sup> In the last 200 years, “to judge was to establish the truth of a crime, it was to determine its author and to apply a legal punishment.”<sup>32</sup> And it is precisely this application of legal punishment that has been suspended.

In 2004, *The New Yorker* magazine obtained a report written by Major General Antonio M. Taguba, which was not meant for public release.<sup>33</sup> The report’s description of the spatial and institutional conditions at Abu Ghuraib was disturbing. Imprisoned in 12 by 12 foot cells that were “little more than human holding pits”<sup>34</sup>, the detainees were waiting for their call. According to the source, there were frequent cases of “sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses.”<sup>35</sup> In one of the photographs released on *The New Yorker* website, a female officer is pointing at the genitals of a young Iraqi, who had to undress, wearing a sandbag over his head as he masturbates. Another image shows a kneeling, naked prisoner, posed to make it look like he is performing oral sex on another male inmate, who is naked and hooded. What Foucault had once, through Bentham’s Panopticon, explained as the subtle form of political control in the microclimate of a prison—the enlightenment institution puts away those, who do not fit with the norm—has turned into a scenario in which there is neither political control on the micro-scale he describes, nor a fully operative legal framework, which seems to be able to deal with this parasitic relationship between politics and space. Although one can trace these territories on a map geographically, they have been hoisted to a juridical meta-level on which humiliation through spatial and physical practice becomes part of the everyday fabric.

## SPATIAL AUTONOMY AS THE BLUEPRINT OF EVIL

“Camp X-Ray is an island, on an island, on an island. It is a sealed off zone (...), which is itself sealed off from the rest of the island of Cuba. That is one of the reasons the US chose to bring suspects here: it is impossible to get to, unless the US military flies you in.”<sup>36</sup>

BBC report, 2004

The naval base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba is essentially a territory in which prisoners can be held indefinitely beyond scrutiny of US courts. Some of the prisoners have been held there since 2001. Since it is not considered U.S. territory, those imprisoned there have none of the rights of someone brought to American soil. Unlike military bases on U.S. territories, Guantanamo is central to the strategy of preventing judicial review of the legal status of prisoners. Located on Cuban territory, it is the “legal equivalent of outer space”; mainland locations were ruled out as prison sites because they fall under the jurisdiction of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.<sup>37</sup>

George W. Bush claims that detainees are treated humanely. However, the U.S. government does not accept the inmates’ status as Prisoners of War, because, according to U.S. authorities, they have not been fighting in uniform, representing a delineated, governed territory.<sup>38</sup>

The spatial construction of Camp Delta consists of a maze of fences, razor wire and guard towers. Walls are made from chain-link and cells are protected from the elements by corrugated metal sheets. Prisoners spend most of their time in their cells, sitting on the floor or lying on foam sleeping mats. At night the entire territory is lit up so the guards can see their prisoner’s every move. The construction of additional detention units was completed by mid-April 2002 by Brown & Root Services (BRS)—a subsidiary company of oil-venture Halliburton—approximately five miles from Camp X-Ray. Each detention unit is 8 feet long, 6 feet 8 inches wide and 8 feet tall and constructed with metal mesh on a solid steel frame. Each detainee is provided with a foam sleeping mattress, a blanket, and a 1/2 inch thick prayer mat.<sup>39</sup> It is precisely these conditions that have been meticulously designed in order to alter the behaviour of inmates and cause symptoms such as chronic depression, suicide, interpersonal rejection, psychiatric disorder and trauma. It comprises a physical design with the intention to enforce confession. In Guantanamo Bay, spatial components are being used as a tool both to punish and to coerce. As soon as the aim is achieved—that is, as soon as the detainee confesses—the spatial conditions are altered. Detainees who are willing to comply and confess have the opportunity to become a “level one” detainee and live in Camp Four, where prisoners are housed in communal settings.

After heavy criticism regarding the camp’s spatial conditions, in March 2005, the Pentagon announced the shipment of inmates at Guantanamo to prisons in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Yemen, despite fears they could face even worse human rights abuses. The transfers would be similar to the much-criticised

practice known as renditions, under which the CIA has moved prisoners to Syria and Egypt.<sup>40</sup> Since inmates face transfer to countries known to practise torture, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had told the Pentagon as early as 2002 that detainees would suffer from similar conditions.

In 2005, Eric Saar, an American, Arabic-speaking soldier revealed details of prisoner abuse at Guantanamo in the first high-profile whistleblowing account regarding interrogation cells. According to his report<sup>41</sup>, prisoners were physically assaulted and subjected to sexual interrogation techniques by so-called “snatch squads”. Female interrogators stripped down to their underwear would offer pornographic material as rewards for confessing. In one session a female officer took off her clothes and smeared fake blood on a prisoner, telling him she was menstruating.<sup>42</sup> It is only now that the Pentagon has started to confirm cases within the camp in which copies of the Koran were bespattered with urine.<sup>43</sup> A rallying cry to the Muslim world, this ongoing narrative blends with the existing imagery of these spatial enclaves as delineated territories in which anti-Muslim behaviour is suspected to be part of the daily routine. Whether the images of spatial conditions such as prisoners being chained to the ground facing wire-meshed fences in the boiling heat, bodies piled atop of each other, the images of these crushed, shrunken and beaten individuals would raise a common ground for realisation that whether or not the Geneva Conventions apply, a state supposedly based on law and freedom should treat its prisoners accordingly.

#### BEYOND LINEAR NARRATIVE

Taking such spatial conditioning and subsequent behaviour patterns into account, one can no longer ask questions as simple as: why is this possible, who is in charge, or what does it mean? Although the identified problem is physical in nature, the change of spatial components alone would not be sufficient to produce such acts. Each individual condition and case is incredibly complex in nature. Nevertheless, what one can probably assert is that—as the hidden paradigm of modernity—evil, today, exists because of the contiguity of men’s nature and the failure of the enlightenment project. It points at the question of what leads us to be obedient. Does the enlightenment notion of a universal human duty any longer hold sway? Even within a military order that is based on command-and-obey, one has to question the individual ethics of one’s own self-legislation. Does the individual have to become pro-active? Good and evil proper refer to a relation with the will. But how does one combine the subjective and the objective when it comes to the modern-age battlefield? Does the soldier represent himself, and should he therefore be held responsible for his actions, or does he carry responsibility for others—even for the system itself? Respect is different from liking someone or agreeing with a particular position, so the question rather has to be: what is actually presupposed?

One aspect that turns the endeavour of Zimbardo’s psychological experiment in relation to Guantanamo and Abu Ghuraib into an even worse scenario—and suspends part of his argument—is the fact that today’s religious terminology, which creates an entirely different framework, points at the fact

that we still base our judgement on pre-enlightenment terminology. Any kind of monotheism by definition insists that there is only one god—and, of course, presupposes the fact that there is such entity as god in the first place—and therefore radicalises any objective truth. You cannot be a dualist about evil if you are a Christian, a Muslim, a Jew or part of any other order that presupposes truth. And the efforts of the enlightenment eventually intensified this monotheism. Whether George W. Bush's claim that "God told me to strike at al Qaeda and I struck them"<sup>44</sup> or the statements of Islamic radicals and fundamentalist clerics, these statements offer the blueprint of the failure of rational thought. The real question therefore is rather to be found between the lines of under which condition did man invent the judgement system and which is the higher order from which to judge? If one is stuck within a religious system of judgement, it is difficult to submit to The Hague.

The action and re-action being pursued here is based on a punishment in which guilt is being suspended, not only through a higher order, but the bureaucratic structure, which allows for it to take place. In this context, the political promise is not based on trust, but on calculation, such as agreements, which—in case the higher order challenges their compliance—can be suspended. Hence, autonomy signifies a promise to oneself, but not to others. Consequently, one does not have to defend oneself in front of the United Nations, but only against oneself and, optionally, God.

Returning to Agamben, totalitarianism strikes one as extremely modern, because it presupposes the omnipotence of a single person. Under these conditions, the individual bureaucrat only has to follow orders, which often results in the plea that the individual did only follow orders and is therefore not accountable. This implies the giving up of one's own capacity to act and finally turns any act of cruelty into a banality, pretending that "there is no alternative (TINA)."<sup>45</sup>

For journalists, it seems almost impossible to address such issues in an objective manner since one inevitably has a personal narrative that influences one's work. Attempting to deal with such a pre-enlightenment condition, one might radically argue that instead of remembering and creating fixed narratives, we should try to forget: forgetting not as a means of casting shadow onto the past, but rather, as a way of forgiving, a platform for rational thought directed towards the future.

For the Western perspective, this theory could potentially mean that instead of extending an "already existing library of clichés about Arabs"<sup>46</sup>, for example, one could attempt to think about the other—religious or not—without falling into the trap of colonial narrative. In order to achieve the implementation of such argument, one would need to consider the existence of a tradition that lies outside the Western tradition and vice versa. While resisting the mechanism of developing an argument as one moves along, one may suspend individual cause and, although there is never a true neutrality of information, attempt to resist one's demographic audience.

When Udi Aloni, a New York-based Israeli artist, went through the production of “Local Angel”, a documentary about the present contradictions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict<sup>47</sup>, he established a source that illuminates the relationship between concrete political struggle, local negotiation and the significance of spatial overlaps. Through the means of zooming into specific local and urban scales, he managed to obliterate the myth of the “religious battle” as the only form of cultural content in the region and, instead, delivers a space for a secular humanity, a mosaic of fragments pulled together by suspending pre-supposed narrative. Along the same lines, Eyal Weizman—an architect and researcher based in Tel Aviv and London—for his publication “A Civilian Occupation: The Politics of Israeli Architecture”<sup>48</sup> conducted research on behalf of the Human Rights organization B’tselem regarding the planning aspects of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Based on his theory that we are missing verticality, he argues that none of us have a coherent mental map of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: from settlements to sewage, archaeology to military aircraft, his reading offers a rational, penetrating analysis of how ideas about power and planning intersect with politics to shape the spaces in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict develops. This dissection of components that create an overall fabric is what has—so far—been missing within the description of prison space.

Somewhere between the flood of Human Rights documents, the Stanford Prison Experiment, Zacarias De La Rocha’s “is all the world jails and churches?”<sup>49</sup> and Salman Rushdie’s claim that “we need more teachers and fewer priests in our lives”<sup>50</sup>, one starts to trace the failure and bitterness of geopolitics. But zooming out of the spatial enclaves, there is hope: breaking the stoic narrative that suggests the return to pre-enlightenment vision, resisting the re-introduction of moral truisms, turning inside-out the model of the world in which religion is part of the public realm, the answer, on a larger scale, can only be: the return to secular politics.

In a time in which people retreat back into religious categories, in which the world is once again being painted into black and white, one chokes on double-standards, wondering why one should not expect that we apply to ourselves the standards we apply to others and in fact, if we were serious about them, more stringent ones.

#### FOOTNOTES

- 3 Schlesinger, J. R., “Final Report of the Independent Panel to review DoD Detention Operations”, Arlington (VA), August 2004, p.79
- 4 Weizman, E., “The Evil Architects do”, in: *Content* (Koolhaas, Rem (ed.)), Köln: Taschen, 2004, p. 60
- 5 Agamben, G., *The State of Exception*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004
- 6 Lersch, P., “Demokratie im Ausnahmezustand - Die Verhüllte

Freiheitsstatue“, in: Spiegel Online, 27. Oktober 2004

- <sup>7</sup> On September 1, 2004 terrorists captured more than 1300 hostages at a School in Beslan, South Russia. This act of terror was directed specifically at children. Hundreds of children spent 53 hours without water and food in an overcrowded hot gymnasium, wired with explosives. They witnessed the beatings and murders of family members, friends and teachers.
- <sup>8</sup> Strong presidency and presidential administration; president’s appointees in the Federal Districts; appointed governors, party formation from above, selective justice; state-controlled TV
- <sup>9</sup> Marcuse, P., “The ‘War on Terrorism’ and Life in Cities after September 11, 2001”, in: Graham, Stephen (ed.), *Cities, War and Terrorism - Towards an Urban Geopolitics*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, p.263
- <sup>10</sup> Coll, S., *Ghost Wars*, London: Penguin Books, 2005, p. 235
- <sup>11</sup> The Geneva Conventions consist of four documents passed in Switzerland in the aftermath of World War II. They present the international treaties setting rules about the conduct of war. They form the centrepiece of humanitarian law and seek to protect people from the sorts of assaults endured in the fight against Nazism. Almost every country has ratified all four of the conventions, including the United States
- <sup>12</sup> <http://www.genevaconventions.org/> “Geneva Conventions relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War”, General Provisions, Article 1
- <sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, Article 4 (A.2)
- <sup>14</sup> “Renditions and Diplomatic Assurances – Outsourcing Torture“ [see: <http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/torture/renditions.htm>]
- <sup>15</sup> “Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for the U.S. Abuse of Detainees”, Vol. 17, No. 1(G), April 2005 [see: <http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us0405/>]
- <sup>16</sup> Yuval Ginbar, legal advisor to Amnesty International, cited in “The Tacit Acceptance of Torture”, [see: [http://hrw.org/reports/2005/eca0405/4.htm#\\_Toc100558824](http://hrw.org/reports/2005/eca0405/4.htm#_Toc100558824)]
- <sup>17</sup> “Diplomatic Assurances allowing torture - Growing Trend defies international law“, April 15, 2005 [see: <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/04/15/eu10479.htm>]
- <sup>18</sup> Malinowski, T., in: “U.S. State Department 2004 Human Rights Reports - Testimony to U.S. House of Representatives”, Human Rights Watch document, March 18, 2005 [see: <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/18/usint10347.htm>]
- <sup>19</sup> In “Homo Sacer” (1995, Italian original version) and “The State of Exception” (2004)
- <sup>20</sup> Arendt, H., *The Human Condition*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958
- <sup>21</sup> See Agamben, G., *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics, Stanford (CA): Stanford University Press, 1998

- <sup>22</sup> “Salò or The 120 Days of Sodom”, Pasolini’s adaptation of the Marquis de Sade, a disturbing film that faces our unwillingness to confront the “real and inescapable”, that is the relationship between sex, death and power
- <sup>23</sup> See also: Zweifel, S., and Pfister, M., “Die 120 Tage von Abu Ghraib”, in: Cicero, June 2004
- <sup>24</sup> Hersh, S. M., “Torture at Abu Ghraib”, *New Yorker*, 3 May, 2004, [see also: [http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa\\_fact](http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa_fact)]
- <sup>25</sup> Foucault, M., *Discipline & Punish – The Birth of the Prison* (first translated by Alan Sheridan in 1977), New York City: Vintage Books (Random House), 1995, p.8
- <sup>26</sup> Soulatges, J. A., *Traite des crimes, I* (1762), cited in: Foucault, M., *Discipline & Punish – The Birth of the Prison* (first translated by Alan Sheridan in 1977), New York City: Vintage Books (Random House), 1995, p.32
- <sup>27</sup> Foucault, M., *Discipline & Punish – The Birth of the Prison* (first translated by Alan Sheridan in 1977), New York City: Vintage Books (Random House), 1995, p.9
- <sup>28</sup> Hirst, P., *Space and Power - Politics, War and Architecture*, Cambridge: Polity, 2005, p.26
- <sup>29</sup> Hirst, Paul, *Space and Power - Politics, War and Architecture*, Cambridge: Polity, 2005, p.167
- <sup>30</sup> *ibid.*, p.169
- <sup>31</sup> Foucault, M., *Discipline & Punish – The Birth of the Prison* (first translated by Alan Sheridan in 1977), New York City: Vintage Books (Random House), 1995, p.16
- <sup>32</sup> *ibid.*, p.19
- <sup>33</sup> Hersh, Seymour M., “Torture at Abu Ghraib,” *New Yorker*, 3 May, 2004, [see also: [http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa\\_fact](http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa_fact)]
- <sup>34</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>35</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>36</sup> Lister, R., “Grim life at Guantanamo”, in: BBC, Feb 7, 2002
- <sup>37</sup> see “Guantanamo Bay - Camp Delta”, in: [www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay\\_delta.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay_delta.htm)
- <sup>38</sup> “Bush lässt Alternativen zu Guantanamo prüfen”, in: Spiegel Online, June 9, 2005
- <sup>39</sup> see “Guantanamo Bay - Camp Delta”, in: [www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay\\_delta.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay_delta.htm)
- <sup>40</sup> see Goldenberg, S., “US faces Cuban prison crisis”, in: *The Age*, March 13, 2005
- <sup>41</sup> Outline and details of report can be found in: Harris, P., “Soldier lifts lid on Camp Delta”, in: *The Observer*, May 8, 2005
- <sup>42</sup> *ibid.*

- <sup>43</sup> “Bush lässt Alternativen zu Guantanamo prüfen”, in: Spiegel Online, June 9, 2005
- <sup>44</sup> Kamen, A., “Road Map in the Back Seat?”, in: Washington Post, June 27, 2003, p. A27
- <sup>45</sup> Term coined by Pierre Wack, a French oil executive arguing that strategy as it had been practiced (straight-line extrapolations from the past) did little to frame the choices that would define the future. The true role of strategy in his sense of the world was to describe a future worth creating, and then to reap the competitive advantages of preparing for it and making it happen. Strategy, in other words, was about telling stories
- <sup>46</sup> Said, E., “The Last Interview” (DVD, extended version), London: ICA Projects (© The Estate of Edward Said), 2004
- <sup>47</sup> Aloni, U., *Local Angel, Theological Political Fragments*, London: ICA, 2004
- <sup>48</sup> Weizman, E. and Rafi Segal (eds.), *A Civilian Occupation: The Politics of Israeli Architecture* (“The Banned Catalogue”), revised edition, Babel publishers, Tel Aviv, Verso, London and New York, 2003
- <sup>49</sup> De la Rocha, Z. M., “Vietnow”, in: *Evil Empire* (recorded by *Rage Against The Machine*), 1996 (Sony Music)
- <sup>50</sup> Rushdie, S., “In Bad Faith“, in: The Guardian, Monday March 14, 2005